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Abstract—The detection of anomalies is essential mining task
for the security and reliability in computer systems. Logs are a
common and major data source for anomaly detection methods in
almost every computer system. They collect a range of significant
events describing the runtime system status. Recent studies
have focused predominantly on one-class deep learning methods
on predefined non-learnable numerical log representations. The
main limitation is that these models are not able to learn
log representations describing the semantic differences between
normal and anomaly logs, leading to a poor generalization of
unseen logs. We propose Logsy, a classification-based method
to learn log representations in a way to distinguish between
normal data from the system of interest and anomaly samples
from auxiliary log datasets, easily accessible via the internet.
The idea behind such an approach to anomaly detection is
that the auxiliary dataset is sufficiently informative to enhance
the representation of the normal data, yet diverse to regularize
against overfitting and improve generalization. We propose an
attention-based encoder model with a new hyperspherical loss
function. This enables learning compact log representations
capturing the intrinsic differences between normal and anomaly
logs. Empirically, we show an average improvement of 0.25 in
the F1 score, compared to the previous methods. To investigate
the properties of Logsy, we perform additional experiments
including evaluation of the effect of the auxiliary data size, the
influence of expert knowledge, and the quality of the learned log
representations. The results show that the learned representation
boost the performance of the previous methods such as PCA with
a relative improvement of 28.2%.
Index Terms—anomaly detection, log data, transformers, sys-
tems reliability
I. INTRODUCTION
Anomaly detection [1]–[3] is a data mining task of finding
observations in a corpus of data that differ from the expected
behaviour. Anomalies in large systems such as cloud and high-
performance computing (HPC) platforms can impact critical
applications and a large number of users [4]. Owing to the
inevitable weaknesses in software and hardware, systems are
prone to failures, which can potentially harm them to a large
extent [5], [6]. Timely and accurate detection of such threats
is necessary for reliability, stable operation, and mitigation of
losses in a complex computer system.
Logs are an important data source for anomaly detection in
computer systems [7]–[9]. They represent interactions between
data, files, services, or applications, and are typically utilized
by developers, and data-driven methods to understand system
behaviours and to detect, localize, and resolve problems that
may arise. Log messages have free-form text structure written
by the developers, which record a specific system event de-
scribing the runtime system status. Specifically, a log message
is a composition of constant string template and variable values
originating from logging instruction (e.g., print(”total of %i
errors detected”, 5)) within the source code.
A common approach for log anomaly detection is one-class
classification [10], where the objective is to learn a model
that describes the normal system behaviour, usually assuming
that most of the unlabeled training data is non-anomalous and
that anomalies are samples that lie outside of the learned
decision boundary. The massive log data volumes in large
systems have renewed the interest in the development of one-
class deep learning methods to extract general patterns from
non-anomalous samples. Previous studies have been focused
mostly on the application of long short-term memory (LSTM)-
based models [8], [9], [11]. They leverage log parsing [12],
[13] on the normal log messages and transform them into
log templates, which are then utilized to train the models.
The formulated task is to predict the next index of the
log template in the sequence tm+1 by utilizing the history
of template indices H = t0, . . . , tm. In other disciplines,
numerous deep learning methods increase their performances
by incorporating large amounts of data available through the
internet. A common approach to use these data is unsupervised
learning. In natural language processing (NLP), word2vec [14]
and more recent language models BERT [15] are standard and
responsible for significant improvements in various NLP tasks.
These models are pretrained on large corpora of text such as
Wikipedia and later fine-tuned on the particular task or dataset.
Recent studies in log anomaly detection [9], [11] utilize a
pre-trained word embeddings to numerically represent the log
templates instead of the integer log sequences [8], where they
observe small improvements in the prediction of unseen logs.
However, the learning of the sequence of template indices
and the enhanced log message embedding approaches still
have large limitations in terms of generalization for previously
unseen log messages. They tend to produce false predictions
owing to the imperfect log vector representations. For exam-
ple, learning sequence of indices fails to correctly classify a
newly appearing log messages, and, the domain where the
word vectors are pre-trained (e.g., Wikipedia) has essential
differences from the language used in computer system de-
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velopment. To partly mitigate some of these limitations, a
possibility is to incorporate labeled data from operators and
perform life-long learning [16]. Yet, it still requires frequent
periodical retraining, updates, and costly expert knowledge to
label the data, without addressing the problem of generaliza-
tion on unseen logs that appear between retraining epochs.
Often, the assumption for the normal data in anomaly detec-
tion methods is that it should be compact [17]. This means the
normal log messages should have vector representations with
close distances between each other, e.g., concentrated within a
tight sphere, and the anomalies should be spread far from the
distribution of the normal samples. We propose a new anomaly
detection method that directly addresses the challenge of ob-
taining representative and compact numerical log embeddings.
We train a neural network to learn log vector representations
in a manner to separate the normal log data from the system
of interest and log messages from auxiliary log datasets from
other systems, easily accessible via the internet. The concept
of such a classification approach to anomaly detection is that
the auxiliary dataset helps learn a better representation of
the normal data while regularizing against overfitting. This
ultimately leads to a better generalization in unseen logs.
For example, for a target system logs of interest T where
anomaly detection needs to be performed, as auxiliary data
could be employed one or more datasets from an open-source
log repository (e.g., [18]). As a neural network architecture, we
adopt the Transformer encoder with multi-head self-attention
mechanism [19], which learns context information from the
log message in the form of log vector representations (embed-
dings). We propose a hyperspherical learning objective that
enforces the model to learn compact log vector representations
of the normal log messages. This enforces for the normal
samples to have concentrated (compact) vector representations
around the centre of a hypersphere. It enables better separation
between the normal and the anomaly data, where a distance
from the centre of such a sphere is used to represent an
anomaly score. Small distances correspond to normal samples,
while large distances correspond to anomalies. The method
also enables a direct log-to-vector transformation, which can
be used to improve the performances of previous related
methods. Additionally, it allows the operator to intervene and
correct misclassified samples, which could be used for the next
retraining of the model.
The contributions of this study can be summarized in the
following points.
1) A new classification-based method for log anomaly
detection utilizing self-attention and auxiliary easy-
accessible data to improve log vector representation.
2) Modified objective function using hyperspherical deci-
sion boundary, which enables compact data representa-
tions and distance-based anomaly score.
3) The proposed approach is evaluated against three real
anomaly detection datasets from HPC systems, Blue
Gene/L, Thunderbird, and Spirit. The method signifi-
cantly improves the evaluation scores compared to those
in the previous studies.
4) In another set of experiments, an investigation of the
effects of variations in the amount of auxiliary data
for anomaly detection and inclusion of labelled data is
performed.
5) We provide an open-source implementation of the
method.
II. RELATED WORK
A significant amount of research and development of meth-
ods for log anomaly detection has been published in both
industry and academia [8], [9], [11], [12], [20], [21].Super-
vised methods were applied in the past to address the log
anomaly detection problem. For example, [20] applied a
support vector machine (SVM) to detect failures, where both
normal and anomalous samples are assumed to be available.
For an overview of supervised approaches to log anomaly
detection we refer to Brier et al. [22]. However, obtaining
system-specific labelled samples is costly and often practically
infeasible.
Several unsupervised learning methods have been proposed
as well. Xu et al. [21] proposed using the Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) method, where they assume that there are
different sessions in a log file that can be easily identified by
a session-id attached to each log entry. It first groups log keys
by session and then counts the number of appearances of each
log key value inside each session. A session vector is of size
n, representing the number of appearances for each log key
in K in that session. A matrix is formed where each column
is a log key, and each row is one session vector. PCA detects
an abnormal vector (a session) by measuring the projection
length on the residual subspace of a transformed coordinate
system. The publicly available implementation allows for the
term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) repre-
sentation of the log messages, utilized in our experiments as
a baseline. Lou et al. [23] proposed Invariant Mining (IM) to
mine the linear relationships among log events from log event
count vectors.
The wide adoption of deep learning methods resulted in
various new solutions for log-based anomaly detection. Zhang
et al. [24] used LSTM to predict the anomaly of log sequence
based on log keys. Similar to that, DeepLog [8] also use
LSTM to forecast the next log event and then compare it with
the current ground truth to detect anomalies. Vinayakumar
et al. [25] trained a stacked-LSTM to model the operation
log samples of normal and anomalous events. However, the
input to the unsupervised methods is a one-hot vector of logs
representing the indices of the log templates. Therefore, it
cannot cope with newly appearing log events.
Some studies have leveraged NLP techniques to analyze
log data based on the idea that log is a natural language
sequence. Zhang et al. [24] proposed to use the LSTM model
and TF-IDF weight to predict the anomalous log messages.
Bertero et al. [26] used word2vec and traditional classifiers,
like SVM and Random Forest, to check whether a log
event is an anomaly or not. Similarly, LogRobust [9] and
LogAnomaly [11] incorporate pre-trained word vectors for
learning of a sequence of logs where they train an attention-
based Bi-LSTM model.
Different from all the above methods, we add domain
bias on the anomalous distribution to improve detection [27].
We provide such bias by employing easily accessible log
datasets as an auxiliary data source. We evaluate Logsy against
unsupervised approaches, as even it is a classification based
approach, it does not use labels from the target system,
which as mentioned are often infeasible to obtain. From
the perspective of using labels of the target system it is an
unsupervised approach.
III. TOWARDS CLASSIFICATION-BASED LOG ANOMALY
DETECTION
Anomaly detection can be also viewed as density level set
estimation [28]. Steinwart et al. [27] state that this can be
interpreted as binary classification between the normal and
the anomalous distribution and point out that the bias on
the anomalous distribution is essential for improved detection.
Meaning that if we provide some information to the model of
how anomalous data looks like, it will boost its performance.
For instance, we may interpret the class assumption that
semi-supervised anomaly detection approaches require on the
anomalies, as such prior knowledge [17]. Moreover, specific
types of data can have an inherent properties that allows us
to make more informed prior assumptions such as the word
representations in texts [29]. Here the assumption is that each
word meaning depends on its context.
We assume that drawing realistic samples from some aux-
iliary easy-access corpus of log data, can be much more
informative for an added description of normal and anomalies
compared to sampling noise, or no data used. The use of
auxiliary data adds extra value to the method, while preserving
the information from the normal data.
PROBLEM DEFINITION. Let D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}
be the training logs from the system of interest where xi ∈
Rd is a log message where it words are represented in
d − dimensional space (the log message is represented
by d × |r| matrix, where |r| is number of words) and
yi = 0; 1 < i ≤ n, assuming that the data in the sys-
tem of interest is mostly composed of normal samples. Let
A = {(xn, yn), . . . , (xn+m, yn+m)}, where m is the size
of the auxiliary data and yi = 1;n < i ≤ n + m. Let
φ(xi, yi, θ) : Rd → Rp be a function represented by a neural
network, which maps the input log message embeddings to
vector representations in Rp, and l : Rp → [0, a], a ∈ R
be a function, which maps the output to an anomaly score.
The task is to learn the parameters θ from the training data,
and then for each incoming instance in the prediction phase
Dt = {(xt1), (xt2), . . . , (xtj ), . . . }, t indicates test sample,
predict whether it is anomaly or normal based on the anomaly
scores obtained by l(φ(xi, yi, θ)).
IV. SELF-ATTENTIVE ANOMALY DETECTION WITH
CLASSIFICATION-BASED OBJECTIVE
In this section, we explain the proposed method in de-
tail. We provide formal definitions needed for explaining the
method. We describe the data preprocessing, the neural net-
work, the log vector representations, and how they are utilized
in the modified objective function for anomaly detection.
A. Preliminaries
We define a log as a sequence of temporally ordered
unstructured text messages L = (xi : i = 1, 2, ...), where
each message xi is generated by a logging instruction (e.g.
printf(), log.info()) within the software source code, and i is
its positional index within the sequence. The log messages
consist of a constant and an optional varying part, respectively
referred to as log template and variables.
The smallest inseparable singleton object within a log
message is a token. Each log message consists of a finite
sequence of tokens, ri = (wj : wj ∈ V, j = 1, 2, ..., si),
where V is a set (vocabulary) of all tokens, j is the positional
index of a token within the log message xi, and si is the
total number of tokens in xi. We use |ri| instead of si
in following. For different xi, |ri| can vary. Depending on
the concrete tokenization method, wj can be a word, word
piece, or character. Therefore, tokenization is defined as a
transformation function T : x→ r.
With respect to our proposed method, the notions of context
and numerical vector representation (embedding vector) are
additionally introduced. Given a token wj , its context is
defined by a preceding and subsequent sequence of tokens,
i.e. a tuple of sequences: C(wj) = ((w1, w2, ..., wj−1),
(wj+1, wj+2, ..., w|ri|)), where 0 ≤ j ≤ |ri|. An embedding
vector is a d-dimensional real valued vector representation
s ∈ Rd of either a token or a log message.
In the learned vector space, similar log messages should
be represented by closer embedding vectors while largely
different log messages should be distant. For example, the
embedding vectors for ”Took 10 seconds to create a VM” and
”Took 9 seconds to create a VM” should have a small distance
in d-dimensional space, while vectors for ”Took 9 seconds to
create a VM” and ”Failed to create VM 3” should be distant.
We refer to the data from the system of interest as target
dataset, i.e., the system where we want to detect anomalies.
Important to note is that we are not using any anomaly
data from the target system for learning purposes in our
experiments. The term auxiliary data refers to other non-
related systems, which serve only for training the model. All
the results during test time are performed on a test set extracted
from the target dataset.
B. Logsy
The method is composed of two main parts, the tokeniza-
tion of the log messages and the neural network model. In
the following section, we discuss the inner workings of the
proposed method, which is depicted in Fig. 1.
Tokenization. Tokenization transforms the raw log mes-
sages into a sequence of tokens, as shown in Fig. 1. For
this purpose, we utilize the standard text preprocessing library
NLTK [30]. The message is first filtered for HTTP and system
path endpoints (e.g., /p/gb2/stella/RAPTOR/). Every capital
letter is converted to a lower letter, and all of the ASCII
special characters are removed. The log message is split into
word tokens. We remove every token that contains numerical
characters, as they often represent variables in the log message
and are not informative. Additionally, we remove the most
commonly used English words that are in the stop words
dictionary of NLTK (e.g., the and is). To the front of the
tokenized log message, a special ’[EMBEDDING]’ token is
added. In the model, the ’[EMBEDDING]’ token attends
overall original tokens from the sample, which enables the
model to summarize the context of the log message in the
vector representation. All tokens from every log message form
vocabulary V of size |V|, where each token is represented with
integer label i ∈ 0, 1, . . . , |V| − 1. An important advantage of
Logsy compared to previous approaches is that it does not
depend on log parsers as a pre-processing step. We consider
the tokenized log message as direct input to the model. The
advantage is that there is no loss of information from the log
message, due to the imperfections that exist in the log parsing
methods.
Target-system Training 
data (class 0, normal)
New log data from 
target system
Tokenization
Examples
1. imprecise machine check                    2. machine check interrupt
1. [[EMBEDDING], imprecise, machine, check] 
2. [[EMBEDDING], machine, check, interrupt]
1. [0, 1, 2, 3]
2. [0, 2, 3, 4]
[EMBEDDING] : 0
imprecise : 1
machine : 2
check : 3
interrupt ; 4
Auxiliary data (class 1, 
anomaly)
Encoder of the transformer architecture
Positional encoding: of each word within 
the log message for preserving the 
sequential order
z = Numerical vector of the [EMBEDING] token 
(summarizes the log message)
For test data
Anomaly score:  
‖𝐳‖2
Word embeddings (examples)
[[EMBEDDING]:[0.11, 0.07 …, 0.4], …, 
𝑤𝑖: [0.59, 0.33, …, 0.7]] 
For train data
Spherical Cross-Entropy 
Loss function (z) and 
backpropagate
Multi-head attention
Add & Norm
Feed forward
Add & Norm
N ×
Transformer encoder with multi-head dot-
product self-attention
Key Query Value
Z = [EMBEDDING]: 
[0.23, 0.38, …, 0.82] … 𝑤𝑖
𝑡
Loss(z) and Distance(z)
train split
(normal class)
Test split
(normal & anomalous 
samples) used for 
evaluation only
Target dataset
(e.g., Blue Gene/L)
Other datasets
(e.g., Thunderbird, 
Spirit) used in 
training only
Auxiliary data 
(anomaly class)
Fig. 1. Overview of the architecture and component details of Logsy.
Model. Logsy has two operation modes – offline and online.
During the offline phase, log messages are used to tune all
model parameters via backpropagation and optimal hyper-
parameters are selected. During the online phase, every log
message is passed forward through the saved model. This
generates the respective log vector representation z and an
anomaly score for each message.
As depicted in Fig. 2, the model applies two operations
on the input tokens: token vectorization (word embeddings)
and positional encoding. The subsequent structure is the
encoder of the Transformer [19] module with multi-head
self-attention, which takes the result of these operations as
input. At the output of the encoder, there are |ri| transformed
vector representation from the initial tokens. Recall that the
’[EMBEDDING]’ token has its transformed representation,
which is used as a final log vector representation. We denote
the size of this vector as d. This also represents the size of
all the layers of the model and the word embeddings. The last
two parts are the objective (loss) function during training and
the computation of the anomaly score for test-time samples.
Based on the loss, gradients are back-propagated to tune the
parameters of the model, while based on the anomaly score we
decide if the sample is anomalous or normal. In the following,
we provide a detailed explanation of each element of the
method. Fig. 2 depicts the inner working of the transformer
encoder.
Since all subsequent elements of the model expect numer-
ical inputs, we initially transform the tokens into randomly
initialized numerical vectors x ∈ Rd. These vectors are
referred to as token embeddings and are part of the training
process, which means they are adjusted during training to
represent the semantic meaning of tokens depending on their
context. These numerical token embeddings are passed to
the positional encoding block. In contrast to e.g., recurrent
architectures, attention-based models do not contain any no-
tion of input order. Therefore, this information needs to be
explicitly encoded and merged with the input v ctors to take
their position within the log message into account. This block
calculates a vector n ∈ Rd representing the relative position
of a token based on a sine and cosine function.
n2k = sin
(
j
10000
2k
d
)
, n2k+1 = cos
(
j
10000
2k+1
d
)
. (1)
Here, k = 0, 1, . . . , d − 1 is the index of each element in
n and j = 1, 2, . . . , |ri| is the positional index of each token.
Within the equations, the parameter k describes an exponential
relationship between each value of vector n. The applied sine
and cosine functions allow for better discrimination of the
respective values within a specific vector of n. They have an
approximately linear dependence on the position parameter
j, which is hypothesized to make it easy for the model to
attend to the respective positions. Finally, both vectors can be
combined as x′ = x+n. We summarize all token embedding
vectors of a log message as matrix rows x′T ∈ X ′ on which
the following formula is applied:
Target-system Training 
data (class 0, normal)
New log data from 
target system
Tokenization
Examples
1. Imprecise machine check                    2. Machine check interrupt
1. [[EMBEDDING], imprecise, machine, check] 
2. [[EMBEDDING], machine, check, interrupt]
1. [0, 1, 2, 3]
2. [0, 2, 3, 4]
[EMBEDDING] : 0
imprecise : 1
machine : 2
Check : 3
Interrupt ; 4
Auxiliary data (class 1, 
anomaly)
Encoder of the transformer architecture
Positional encoding: of each word within 
the log message for preserving the 
sequential order
z = Numerical vector of the [EMBEDING] token 
(summarizes the log message)
For test data
Anomaly score:  
‖𝐳‖2
Word embeddings (examples)
[[EMBEDDING]:[0.11, 0.07 …, 0.4], …, 
𝑤𝑖: [0.59, 0.33, …, 0.7]] 
For train data
Spherical Cross-Entropy 
Loss function (z) and 
backpropagate
Multi-head attention
Add & Norm
Feed forward
Add & Norm
N ×
Transformer encoder with multi-head dot-
product self-attention
Key Query Value
Z = [EMBEDDING]: 
[0.23, 0.38, …, 0.82] … 𝑤𝑖
𝑡
Loss(z) and Distance(z)
Fig. 2. Transformer encoder architecture with multi-head self-attention.
X ′′l = softmax
(
Ql ×KTl√
w
)
× Vl, for l = 1, 2, . . . , L. (2)
Thereby, L denotes the number of attention heads, w = dL and
dmodL = 0. The parameters Q, K and V are matrices, that
correspond to the query, key, and value elements in Fig. 2.
They are obtained by applying matrix multiplications between
the input X ′ and respective learnable weight matrices WQl ,
WKl , W
V
l :
Ql = X
′ ×WQl , Kl = X ′ ×WKl , Vl = X ′ ×WVl , (3)
where WQl , W
K
l , W
V
l ∈ RM×w. The division by
√
w
stabilizes the gradients during training. After that, the softmax
function is applied and the result is used to scale each token
embedding vector Vl. The scaled matrices X ′′l are concate-
nated to a single matrix X ′′ of size M × d.
As depicted in Fig. 2 there is a residual connection be-
tween the input token matrix X ′ and its respective attention
transformation X ′′, followed by a normalization layer norm.
These are used for improving the performance of the model
by tackling different potential problems encountered during
the learning such as small gradients and the covariate shift
phenomena. Based on this, the original input is updated by the
attention-transformed equivalent as X ′ = norm(X ′ +X ′′).
The last element of the encoder consists of two feed-forward
linear layers with a ReLU activation in between. It is applied
individually on each row of X ′. Thereby, identical weights for
every row are used, which can be described as a convolution
over each attention-transformed matrix row with kernel size
one. This step serves as additional information enrichment for
the embeddings. Again, a residual connection followed by a
normalization layer between the input matrix and the output
of both layers is employed. This model element preserves the
dimensionality X ′.
The final element of the model consists of a single linear
layer. It receives the encoder result X ′ and extracts the token
embedding vector of the [’EMBEDDING’]. Since every log
message token sequence is pre-padded by this special token,
it is the first row of the matrix, i.e. x′i,0 ∈ X ′,∀i. This vectors
are the log vector representations and are used in the objective
function and as well as log message embeddings.
C. Objective function
To ensure learning of the intrinsic differences of normal and
anomaly log samples, we propose a spherical loss function. It
is designed to integrate the previously mentioned assumption
that normal data is often concentrated having close distances
between the normal samples, while also learning properties to
distinct from anomalous samples. This is done by employing
a radial classification loss which enforces a compact hyper-
spherical decision region for the normal samples.
To derive the loss, we start with the standard binary cross
entropy. Let D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn+m, yn+m)} be the con-
catenation of the training logs from the system of interest
and the auxiliary data with xi ∈ Rd×|ri|, where |ri| is the
number of tokens in the log message and each token is a vector
represented in d−dimensional space. yi ∈ {0, 1}, and yi = 0
denotes normal samples (target system), while yi = 1 denotes
an anomaly (auxiliary data). Let φ(xi, θ) : Rd → Rp be our
encoder architecture that maps the |xi| word embeddings form
the log message to p−dimensional vector. Let l : Rp → [0, 1]
be a function which maps the output to an anomaly score.
Using φ(xi, θ) and l(·),d the standard binary cross-entropy
loss can be written as:
− 1
n
n∑
i=1
(1− yi) log l(φ(xi; θ)) + yi log(1− l(φ(xi; θ))) (4)
For standard classifier function the p−dimensional repre-
sentation is transformed via linear layer followed by sigmoid
activation function:
− 1
n
n∑
i=1
(1− yi) log((1 + exp(−wTφ(xi, θ)))−1)
+yi log(1− (1 + exp(−wTφ(xi, θ)))−1)
(5)
In the standard binary classifier with sigmoid function, the
decision boundary is half-space. The representation of the log
messages is not guaranteed to be compact in this case. It
could be very possible that the normal samples are scattered
through the space with varying, potentially very large distances
between them. To enforce compactness of the representations
of the log messages we utilize the Gaussian radial basis
function as l(·):
l(z) = exp(−‖z‖2) (6)
Replacing the function into the loss function we get the
hyper-spherical classifier:
1
n
n∑
i=1
(1− yi)‖φ(xi; θ)‖2
−yi log(1− exp(−‖φ(xi; θ)‖2))
(7)
This ensures compactness of the normal samples, which will
be enforced to be around the center of a sphere c = 0. For
normal samples, i.e., yi = 0, the loss function will minimize
the distance to c. This results in low values for the left term
in Equation 7. In contrast, the right term of the loss function
favors large distances for the anomalous samples. The center
of a sphere c could be any constant value, which is not relevant
during the optimization.
A possible problem that usually arises in such spherical
classifiers [17] is that the model is prone to learn trivial
solutions by mapping the inputs to output a constant vector,
i.e. c. However, the proposed loss function will not find the
trivial solution because of the second term in the equation,
representing the auxiliary data or the anomalies. To formally
show that, let φ(·) be the encoder network, which maps every
log message to c. It follows that that φ(·) = 0. In this case,
the second term in Equation 7 for yi = 1 will be infinity in
the limit, which acts as a regularizer and prevents learning c
as a trivial vector representation.
D. Anomaly score and detecting anomalies
Considering that the assumption of the objective function
enforces compact, close to the center of the sphere c = 0,
representations, we define our anomaly score as the distance
of the log vectors (obtained from the ’EMBEDDING’ token)
to the center c of the hypersphere.
A(xi) = ‖φ(xi; θ)‖2 (8)
We define low anomaly scores A(xi) to be normal log
messages, while large scores stand for the anomalies. To
decide if the sample is anomalous or normal, we use a
threshold E . If the anomaly scores A(xi) > E , then the
sample is an anomaly, otherwise, we consider it as normal.
This concludes the explanation of the inner workings of the
method. In the following, we describe two properties of the
model.
E. Including expert knowledge
Most computer systems, are to some extend, supervised and
operated by an administrator. Over time, the administrator
can manually inspect a small portion of the log events and
provide labels. As additional option, Logsy allows incorpora-
tion of such labels from the target system. The second term
in Equation 7, used for the auxiliary data, could be also
utilized for the inclusion of operator-labeled samples. This
enables the addition of even more realistic, however, costly
anomaly samples that help to learn the anomaly distribution,
and further improve the performance. The labeled samples
either need to be added together with the auxiliary data
and retrain, or pre-training the model with the normal and
auxiliary data followed by fine-tuning with the labeled data.
With such a training procedure, the model extracts the relevant
information from the auxiliary data and already learns good
log representations for anomaly detection, as later shown in
the experiments. The replacement of the auxiliary data with
the labeled samples allows the model to only fine-tune its
parameters in a few epochs. This preserves the already learned
information from the larger auxiliary dataset as a bias to the
fine-tuning procedure. In the experiments, we show that the
inclusion of a small portion of labeled samples improves the
performance of the model.
F. Vector representations of the logs
Learning numerical vector representations from the logs
is fundamental for the performance of any machine learning
method for log anomaly detection. Logsy can be utilized for
obtaining such numerical log representations. These repre-
sentations are used by the objective function of the method,
to perform anomaly detection, but could be as well used to
replace other, less powerful representations (e.g., TF-IDF in
previous log-based anomaly detection methods such as the
PCA [21]), aiming to enhance their anomaly detection.
normalanomaly
Fig. 3. Ideal distribution of the log vector representations in space.
The transformed vector of the [’EMBEDDING’] token is
used for representing the context of the log message, which
is the only output of the model to the loss function. Thus, it
is forced to summarize the log message. By using the spher-
ical classification decision boundary, we enforce the normal
samples to be close to each one and compactly represented
around the center of the sphere. This leaves the anomalies to
disperse around the spherical decision boundary in the high-
dimensional space. In Fig. 3, we illustrate a lower-dimensional
plot of how the ideal log representations should look like. A
decision boundary (dashed line) can be drawn to optimally
separate the classes. We demonstrate such behavior in the
evaluation section on real data with Logsy, where we show
TABLE I
DATASET DETAILS.
System #Messages #Anomalies #Anomalies5m
#Unique Log messages
in test and not in train for every split total uniquemessages10% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Blue Gene/L 4747963 348460 348460 2679 2621 2256 2231 465 4486
Thunderbird 211212192 3248239 226287 334 127 71 27 12 3279
Spirit 272298969 172816564 764890 1091 1028 297 129 73 3441
how the normal and abnormal samples are distributed in low
dimensional space.
V. EVALUATION
To quantify the performance of Logsy, we perform a va-
riety of experiments. We compare the method against two
publicly available baselines DeepLog and PCA on three real-
world HPC log datasets. We describe the main properties
of the datasets, discuss the experimental setup, and present
the results. We empirically and qualitatively evaluate the log
vector representations from Logsy, where we utilize them in
the PCA method and observed improved performance. Logsy
is evaluated against unsupervised approaches, as from the
perspective of using labels of the target system, it is an
unsupervised approach.
A. Experimental setup
We select three open real-world datasets from HPC systems
for evaluation as target systems, namely Blue Gene/L, Spirit,
and Thunderbird [18]. They share an important characteristic
associated with the appearance of many new log messages
in the timeline of the data, i.e., the systems change over
time. Furthermore, as an additional dataset for enriching the
auxiliary data in all experiments we use the HPC RAS log
dataset [31]. Due to the absence of labels this dataset cannot
be used for evaluation purposes–can not be a target dataset.
For each target dataset as an auxiliary data to represent the
anomaly class we use logs from the remaining datasets. It is
important to note that the target vs auxiliary splits, ensure that
there is no leak of information from the target system into the
auxiliary data. Meaning, there are no labeled samples from
the target system into the auxiliary data. These logs consist
only of easily accessible logs from other systems via the
internet. The non-anomalous samples from the target system
are the target dataset. For example, when Blue Gene/L is our
system of interest (i.e., the target system) proportion of the
negative samples of Thunderbird, Spirit, and RAS are used
as an auxiliary dataset to represent the anomaly class. These
auxiliary samples could be also error messages obtained from
online code repositories (e.g., GitHub). We perform anomaly
detection on the test samples from the target dataset for
determining the scores.
The datasets are collected between 2004 and 2006 on
three different supercomputing systems: Blue Gene/L, Thun-
derbird, and Spirit. The logs contain anomaly and normal
messages identified by anomaly category tags and are therefore
amenable to anomaly detection and prediction research. All
systems were ranked on the Top500 Supercomputers List at
the time (as of June 2006). The various machines are produced
by IBM, Dell, Cray, and HP. All systems were installed at
Sandia National Labs (SNL), except Blue Gene/L, which is
at Lawrence Livermore National Labs (LLNL). In Table I we
summarize the main characteristics of the datasets.
Table I shows that Thunderbird and Spirit are quite
large datasets of more than 200 million log messages. For
computation-time purposes we restrict the data size on the
first 5 million, when sorted by timestamp, log messages. We
ensure that the 5 million log lines preserve the properties of
the dataset, as shown in Table I, which is that new unseen
logs appear in the test data split. The Blue Gene/L dataset
has less than 5 million messages, thus we keep it in total.
#Anomalies5m shows the number of anomalous log messages
in those 5 million messages.
To evaluate the robustness and generalization of Logsy in
detail, we conduct several experiments with different train-
test splits on the target dataset. To ensure that the test data
contains new log messages previously unseen in the training
we always split the data when sorted by the timestamp of the
log messages. We perform 5 different data splits to cover as
many possible scenarios, i.e., the first 10% training; 90% test
data, 20% training – 80% test, 40% training – 60% test, 60%
training – 40% test, and 80% training – 20% test.
The number of unique log messages after tokenization is
presented in Table I. We observe that in every split there are
new previously unseen log messages that appear in the test
data, which is the main point for empirically proving general-
ization. Decreasing the size of the training data increases the
number of novel log messages in the test split.
1) Evaluation methods: To enable comparability between
our method to the previous work, we adopt the standard eval-
uation scores. We evaluate our method in F1-score, precision,
recall, accuracy, which depends on the true negatives (TN),
true positives (TP), false negatives (FN), and false positives
(FP) predictions. The positive class of 1, is assumed to be an
anomalous log.
2) Baselines: We compare Logsy against two publicly
available baseline methods, i.e., PCA [21] and Deeplog [8].
The current claimed state-of-the-art method LogAnomaly [11]
to best of our knowledge has no publicly available im-
plementation, as it is industry-related research. More-
over, LogAnomaly reports only marginal improvement over
DeepLog of 0.03 F1 score, and thus both approaches are
relatively comparable. The parameters of these methods are
all tuned to produce their best F1 score.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of the evaluation scores against the two baselines DeepLog and PCA on three different datasets.
3) Logsy: Implementation details: Every log message dur-
ing tokenization is truncated to a maximum of max(|ri|) = 50
tokens. Logsy has two layers of the transformer encoder, i.e.,
N=2 in Fig. 1. The words are embedded with 16 neural units,
and the higher level vector representations obtained with the
transformer encoding are all of the same sizes. The size of
the feed-forward network that takes the output of the multi-
head self-attention mechanism is also 16, which makes the
’[EMBEDDING]’ vector the same size. For the optimization
procedure for every experiment, we use a dropout of 0.05,
Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 0.0001, weight decay
of 0.001. We address the imbalanced number of normal versus
anomaly samples with adding weights to the loss function for
the two classes, 0.5 for the normal and 1.0 for the anomaly
class. The models are trained until convergence and later
evaluated on the respective test split.
B. Results and discussion
We show the overall performance of Logsy compared to
the baselines in Fig. 4. Generally, Logsy achieves the best
scores, having an averaged F1 score in all the splits of 0.448
on the Blue Gene/L dataset, 0.99 on the Thunderbird dataset,
and 0.77 on the Spirit data. Both DeepLog and PCA, have
lower F1 scores in all experiments performed. It is shown that
the baselines have a very high recall, but also low precision.
This means they can find the anomalies, however, producing
large amounts of false-positive predictions. Logsy, on the
other hand, preserves the high recall across the datasets and
evaluation scenarios but shows a large improvement in the
precision scores. This is due to the correct classification of new
unseen log messages and the reduction of the false positive
rate. For instance, on the Blue Gene/L dataset, DeepLog and
PCA respectively show 2-4 times lower precision compared to
Logsy. Overall, Logsy is the most accurate method having an
average of 0.9. If a log anomaly detection method generates
too many false alarms, it will add too much overhead to the
operators and a large amount of unnecessary work. Therefore,
high precision methods are favourable. DeepLog leverage the
indexes of log templates, which ignore the meaning of the
words in the log messages, to learn the anomalous and normal
patterns. However, different templates having different indexes
can share common semantic information and both could be
normal. Ignoring this information results in the generation of
false positives for DeepLog compared to Logsy.
We notice that increasing the training size also increases
the F1 score in almost all methods, except for the last two
splits in Spirit. These splits are unfortunate as they have a very
small number of anomalies. Important to note is that Logsy
outperforms the baselines even when only 10% of the data is
training data. For example, in Blue Gene/L we have 0.32 F1-
score on 10% training data, while the largest F1-score of the
baselines is 0.24. In Thunderbird, this difference is even more
noticeable, where an F1-score of 0.99 is already achieved in
with the first 10%. This shows that even with a small amount
of training data from the target system, Logsy extracts the
needed information of what causes a log message to be normal
or anomaly, and produces accurate predictions even in unseen
samples.
1) The effect of the auxiliary data on the evaluation scores:
In this experiment, we perform an analysis of how Logsy
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Fig. 5. Increasing the size auxiliary dataset, where the target system are Blue Gene/L, Thunderbird, and Spirit (left, middle, right) on 20% train - 80% test
split
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Fig. 6. Increasing the size of the labeled anomaly data in the Blue Gene/L
dataset (20% train - 80% test).
performs when with various sizes of the auxiliary data. We
evaluate the same target vs auxiliary data split for all datasets.
We evaluate the approach on the 20%-80% train/test split.
The results are shown in Fig. 5 for all datasets. When the
auxiliary data increases from 1 to 250000 we observe an
increase in all evaluation scores. We observe that increasing
the size of the auxiliary data from 100000 to 250000 the
scores do not change in both cases. This shows that the
amount of information present in the auxiliary data is similar
and all cases are already present in 100000 random samples.
We note that having just one auxiliary sample, which might
even be generated artificially, sufficiently acts as a regularizer
to the hypersphere loss function, preventing it from learning
trivial solutions. Of course, increasing the variety of data (e.g.,
including more diverse log datasets) could further improve
the performance, due to the increased number of samples
representing abnormality.
2) Including expert labeling: Often systems are operated by
a human operator which is an expert and has system-specific
knowledge. Sometimes they could provide or manually label
samples to improve the performance of the model. Here we
experiment with the incremental inclusion of anomaly labels of
the target dataset to test the model behaviour. We experiment
on the 20%-80% split of the Blue Gene/L dataset. Fig. 6 shows
the results. Increasing the number of labelled anomaly samples
improves performance. For as less as 2% labelled data we
already have the best performance of 0.8 F1-score. This shows
that adding a few percentages of anomalies as labelled samples
to Logsy, the performance dramatically improves. This only
strengthens the hypothesis where the log anomaly detection
must be addressed with an understanding of what causes a
log message to be normal or anomaly. The labelled anomalies
from the target system present information Logsy exploits to
learn the differences between the normal and anomalous logs
on the target dataset.
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Fig. 7. Visualisations of the log vector representations of Blue Gene/L with
T-SNE [32].
3) Utilization of the learned log embeddings in related
approaches: In this experiment, we perform the extraction
of the learned log message vector representations from the
already trained Logsy. To illustrate the vector representations
of the logs, in Fig. 7, we show their lower-dimensional
representation of the test split via the T-SNE dimensionality
reduction method [32] on the Blue Gene/L dataset. We show
that the log vector representations are somehow structured in
a way following the definition of our spherical loss function
(see Section IV-F). We can observe that the normal samples
are concentrated around the centre of a hypersphere, which is a
circle in two dimensions. Most of the anomalies are dispersed
among the space outside of the sphere. Assigning a threshold
on the anomaly score A(xi), i.e., the distance from the centre
of the sphere (circle), we could obtain good performance.
Furthermore, to evaluate the general importance of the
log embeddings, we perform experiments where we replace
the original TF-IDF log representations in PCA [21], as the
lowest-performing method, with the extracted embeddings
from Logsy. We depict the results in the bar plot in Fig. 8.
We observe that this replacement of the log representation
improves the performance of PCA. We show improvement of
0.09, 0.11, and 0.01 F1-score for Blue Gene/L, Thunderbird,
and Spirit respectively. This demonstrates that log represen-
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Fig. 8. Comparison in F1 score between the standard PCA [21] and PCA
using the embeddings extracted from our method (80%-20% split).
tation learning has an impact, not only in Logsy, but also in
previous approaches that could be adapted to use the new log
embeddings. The relative improvement of the scores in average
is 28.2% in the F1-score.
VI. CONCLUSION
Log anomaly detection is important to enhance the security
and reliability of computer systems. Existing approaches lack
generalization on new, unseen log samples, which comes
from the evolution of logging statements as a consequence of
system updates and the processing noise. To overcome this
problem, we proposed a new anomaly detection approach,
called Logsy. It is based on a self-attention encoder network
with a hyperspherical classification objective. We formulated
the log anomaly detection problem in a manner to discriminate
between normal training data from the system of interest and
samples from auxiliary easy-access log datasets from other
systems, which represent an abnormality. We have presented
experimental evidence that our classification-based method
performs well for anomaly detection. The results of our
method outperformed the baselines by a large margin of 0.25
F1 score. Furthermore, we demonstrated that the produced
log vector representations could be utilized generally in other
methods. We demonstrated that by adopting PCA to use the
log vectors from Logsy, where we observed improvement of
0.07 (28.2%) in the F1 score.
We believe that future research on log anomaly detection
should focus on finding alternative ways to incorporate richer
domain bias emphasising the diversity of normal and anomaly
data.
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